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ABSTRACT
One of the curiosities about the Japanese banking sector for Westerners is the close connection
between banks and the financial authority, namely Ministry of Finance (MoF). One of the
important sources of this connection is the practice called  amakudari. Amakudari symbolizes
the practice under which retired government officials "descend from their heaven" to be
employed in the private sector. The practice has long been carried out in the banking sector, as
well as many other industrial sectors in Japan.
Previous studies, particularly Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001), examined the effect of the close
connection between banks and the financial authority in Japan, so-called amakudari. However,
their observation did not cover the  “post-bubble” period in which one may expect some
changes.  The present study reexamines this  amakudari practice adopting the latest data,
redesigning and developing the previous model. It found that the overall effect of amakudari
was reduced through the 1990s, but  this is just because of the reduction of  amakudari
appointments. In fact, the gap between the banks with amakudari and the others became even
wider in recent years.
Keywords amakudari, financial supervision, Japan, incentives of regulator, post-bubble
1. Introduction
One of the curiosities about the Japanese banking sector for Westerners is the close connection
between banks and the financial authority, namely Ministry of Finance (MoF). One of the3
important sources of this connection is the practice called  amakudari. Amakudari symbolizes
the practice under which retired government officials "descend from heaven (= the
government)" to be employed in the private sector. The practice has long been carried out in the
banking sector, as well as many other industrial sectors in Japan.
In the past, such connection was often considered useful to the development of Japanese
banking sector as a means of supervision by the financial authority. The close human
relationship made it easier for banks and public officials to communicate with each other.
Moreover, many public officials viewed the amakudari employment as a compensation for their
hard work when working for the ministry. According to the survey in 1994, seventy-six per cent
of high-rank public officials believed that the amakudari system was necessary, and about one
third of them mentioned their low salary as the reason for that (Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha,
1994).
Nevertheless, this way of supervision had been called into question since the collapse of the
bubble economy in the early 1990s. Seven listed regional and second-tier regional banks failed
in the 1990s, and all of them had employed amakudari executives during the bubble period (see
Table 1). According to Hartcher, the amakudari practice “provided ministry policy makers with
no notable insights into how bank lending was contributing to the  accumulation of a large
speculative bubble in land and stock prices” (1997: 121).
Table 1 Listed regional and second-tier regional banks that failed in the 1990s and the






Hyogo Bank August 1995 2
Taiheiyo Bank March 1996 0
(1 in 1987)
Hanwa Bank November 1996 1
Tokuyo City Bank November 1997 3
Tokyo Sowa Bank June 1999 1
Fukutoku Bank (Namihaya Bank from 1998) August 1999 1
Niigata Chuo Bank October 1999 1
It may be unjust to shift all responsibility to  amakudari executives, because many banks
without amakudari executives also contributed to the bubble economy and  suffered from its
collapse. Also, it is misleading to stress the incompetence of amakudari executives. They had
no previous working experience in the banking sector, but that does not necessarily mean that4
they had "no notable insights". The recruitment of top executives from outside is not uncommon
in the United States and elsewhere. It is just a  prejudice that government officials are
incompetent in the private sector.
Given the fact that all failed banks had employed  amakudari executives, however, many
observers suspect that the employment of  amakudari gives rather negative effect on the
performance of banks. Several studies have addressed this issue. For instance, Horiuchi and
Shimizu (2000) conducted an empirical analysis and concluded that they found that banks with
amakudari executives tend to be engaged in greater risk-taking than others. Van Rixtel and
Hassink (1998) also drew a similar conclusion, particularly emphasizing the positive correlation
between the employment of amakudari executives and the development of lending to risky
industries, such as construction, real estate and financial sectors.
Nevertheless, both studies largely focused on the period before the collapse of the bubble
economy. The data set of Horiuchi and Shimizu only counts the period up to 1991. Van Rixtel
and Hassink dealt with several data sets, but none of them covered the period after 1993.
From the rise of the criticism against collusion between banks and MoF, and from relevant
institutional changes for the supervision of banks in the post-bubble period, it may follow that
the amakudari connection has made less effect, so that the gap between the performance of the
banks with amakudari executives and that of the others became smaller.
However, the validity of this hypothesis should be tested with empirical analysis, and this is
what the present study is aiming at. Regarding the scope of our analysis, we focus on regional
and second-tier regional banks. There are several other types of bank in Japan (city banks, long-
term credit banks, trust banks), but the amakudari practice is the most common among regional
and second-tier regional banks. The second-tier regional banks were originally mutual loan and
savings banks, but they were turned into ordinary commercial banks around 1990. Therefore, it
is not necessary to differentiate the regional and second-tier regional banks, and the phrase
"regional banks" is used here as a comprehensive term, instead of differentiating "regional
banks" and "second-tier regional banks". Due to the availability of relevant data, this study only
focuses on those regional banks listed in the Japanese stock exchange.
The rest of the paper is composed of four parts. The next section looks at the recent
performance of regional banks as well as their  amakudari practice as a whole. Section 3
discusses the models to see how the employment of  amakudari executives affects the
performance of banks, and shows the results of estimation. The discussion starts with the
Horiuchi- Shimizu model, but we modify their model with other set of explanatory variables.
Section 4 examines the time-persistence of the amakudari practice, also applying the model5
proposed by Horiuchi and Shimizu. It considers the change in the conditions where amakudari
occurs. This leads to concluding remarks in the final section.
2. The performance and amakudari employment of Japanese regional banks in the post-
bubble period
There are eighty-two regional banks that were listed in the Japanese stock exchange and
survived (i.e. not went bankruptcy nor merged with/ transferred into another bank) in the market
up to the 1990s. Table 2 indicates the total asset, loan and deposit of those banks. As the bubble
economy collapsed in 1992, the asset reduced by 2.4 per cent. However, the loan kept growing
until 1998. The growth rate of the loan had exceeded that of the asset until 1997. The deposit
showed larger growth than the asset and loan, except in 1992, 1995 and 1997. In 1999, the asset
and loan indicated negative growth reflecting the prolonged economic slump, which particularly
hit the main direction of loans from regional banks, i.e. small- and medium-sized firms.
However, the growth rate of the deposit was positive even in that year. The stable growth of the
deposit at the end of the 1990s corresponds to the growing  propensity to savings among
Japanese, many of whom were encouraged to save money to provide for their post-retirement
under a precarious pension system.
Table 2 Total asset, loan and deposit of eighty-two regional banks: 1992-1999
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Figure 1 shows the average capital/ asset ratio and the average profit/ asset ratio. The
average capital/ asset ratio had been stagnant for several years after the collapse of the bubble
economy. It underwent serious fall in 1997 due to the economic slump, but afterwards turned up
quickly, probably because of the rise in the concern about risk management among the regional6
banks. The average current profit/ asset ratio was generally in the downturn through the post-
bubble period. It was even negative in 1997 and in 1998.
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Figure 2 indicates the number of amakudari executives and the number of banks employing
at least one amakudari executive. Both the number of amakudari executives and the number of
banks employing amakudari executives steadily increased from 1992 to 1995, but turned into
decline afterwards. The most plausible reason for this change is that the MoF was put under
severe social criticism in 1995. Serious bribery scandals were found between the ministry
officials and major banks. In the same year, the ministry was also put to blame for its failure of
smooth management of bad loan problems regarding housing loan companies, as well as for
mishandling of a criminal affair of Daiwa Securities in the United States. As a result, the
number of amakudari executives reduced from fifty-seven in 1992 to forty-five in 1999. It
should be noted, however, that the number of the banks employing amakudari did not decrease
so much. The number of the banks employing amakudari is forty-two in 1992, and forty in
1999. What was decreased instead was the average number of amakudari executives per bank,
as shown in Table 3. It was 1.36 in 1992 and 1.13 in 1999.
Regarding the number of retirements (from banks) and new appointments, fifty-two
amakudari executives were retired and thirty-six appointments were newly made from 1992 to
1999. To divide the period into two parts, there were twenty-two retirements and thirty new7
appointments from 1992 to 1995, and thirty retirements and six new appointments from 1996 to
1999.
Figure 2 The number of amakudari executives in total and the number of banks with at least










1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Year (1992-1999)
number of amakudari executives in eighty-two regional banks
number of banks with amakudari executives
Table 3 Average number of amakudari executives per bank: 1992-1999
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
average number of amakudari
executives per bank
1.36 1.39 1.46 1.44 1.39 1.34 1.21 1.13
Traditionally,  it was often the case that MoF  arranged a new amakudari appointment to
replace a retiring incumbent, so that the ministry could maintain a persistent control. With
reference to the eighty-two regional banks in our data set, such replacement occurred in seven
out of eighteen retirement cases from 1987 to 1991. Nevertheless, such replacements occurred
in only five out of twenty-two retirement cases from 1992 to 1995. Furthermore, there was no
such replacement from 1996 to 1999, even though twenty-nine incumbents retired during that
period.
3. The effect of the amakudari practice on the performance of banks
Methodology and data
Horiuchi and Shimizu are among the first scholars to theorize and  analyse the effect of the
amakudari practice on the performance of regional banks. They formulate the relationship
between taxpayers, banks and financial authority as the one between principal, agent and8
supervisor. They view the amakudari connection as the sign of the collusion between the agent
(banks) and the supervisor (MoF), which benefit themselves at the cost of the principal
(taxpayers). It is assumed that MoF allows banks with amakudari executives to expand more
risk exposure than others, in return for banks’ employing (hence paying good salaries to)
amakudari executives. It is difficult for taxpayers to detect such collusion, if the regulating
process is not transparent as had been the case in Japan at least before the amakudari practice
was brought under severe public criticism.
Based on this theory, they  utilized the following dynamic panel data model in order to
examine the hypothesis that banks with amakudari executives tend to take more risk:
EQTi(t)=b0+ b1EQTi(t-1)+b2GASi(t-1)+b3PROi(t-1)+ b4AM i(t-1)+ui(t)  for i=1,…,n. (1)
where EQTi(t) is the current capital/ asset ratio of bank  i at year t; AMi(t) is a dummy
variable set equal to one if bank  i  employs  amakudari executives at year t (taking zero if
otherwise); GASi(t) is the annual growth rate of total asset at time; and PROi(t) is current profit
per total assets. The panel data consist of 123 regional banks from 1977 to 1991. This panel data
model is “dynamic” in the sense that the set of the explanatory variables includes capital/ asset
ratio at the previous year, i.e. EQTi(t-1). The dynamic panel data model is useful in integrating
the previous state of the dependent variable, so that it clarifies the contribution of the other
explanatory variables to the marginal change of the dependent variable at its given level.
The statistical method utilized for this model was the generalized method of moments
(GMM), which is widely recognized as useful for the analysis of dynamic panel data models.
While GMM has several different estimators, Horiuchi and Shimizu applied the one presented
by Arrelano and Bond, which does not require the assumption of strict exogeneity of
explanatory variables, hence being the most appropriate to their model
1.
The results of the Horiuch and Shimizu model are shown in Table 4. According to this,
EQTi(t-1) and GASi(t-1) are positive at the 1% level; PROi(t-1) is negative at the 1% level; and
AMi(t-1) is negative at the 10% level. The negative contribution of AMi(t-1) to EQTi(t), which
implies that banks tend to have low capital/ asset ratio if they employ amakudari executives in
the previous year, is consistent with their hypothesis.
                                                
1 See Arrelano and Bond (1991) for the explanation of their GMM estimation. Horiuch and Shimizu also
give a concise explanation.9
Table 4 The effect of amakudari on the capital/ asset ratio of the Japanese regional banks:








Arellano-Bond m2 test 0.083
No. of observations 1476
Estimates (t-statistics)
Note: * p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
Source: Horiuchi and Shimizu (2000)
Nevertheless, several questions can be posed to the selection of explanatory variables for this
model. First, it is difficult to understand why the  authors used the employment of amakudari
executives at the previous year, AMi(t-1), but not at the current year, AMi(t), as an explanatory
variable. It would be more natural to assume that the current employment of  amakudari
executives should have an impact on the current capital/ asset ratio.
Secondly, the significance of the asset growth at the previous year, GASi(t-1), to the capital/
asset ratio at the current year, EQTi(t), is not evident. Banks may be encouraged to increase their
capital when their asset grows, but they are not necessarily encouraged to increase their capital/
asset ratio as well.
Thirdly, the contribution of the profit/ asset r atio at the previous year, PROi(t-1), to the
capital/ asset ratio at the current year, EQTi(t), is not clear, either. It might be the case that
profitable banks tend to reserve more capital, and thus has higher capital/ asset ratio. Yet the
annual profit of banks is rarely stable reflecting volatile economic situations. Even if a bank
earned much profit at the previous year and planned to increase its capital at the current year, it
may well change that plan when its profit at the current year is very small. On top of that, it is
difficult to understand why the contribution of PROi(t-1) was negative. For the relationship
between profit and capital, instead, it would be better to assume the positive correlation between
the current profit, PROi(t), and the current capital/ asset ratio, EQTi(t), for more profit allows
banks to reserve more capital.10
In short, even if the above model indicated statistically significant relationships between the
above explanatory variables and the dependent variable EQTi(t), their causality remains unclear
and underexplained.
In light of this, we modify the above model as follows. First, AMi(t-1) and PROi(t-1) is
replaced with AMi(t) and PROi(t) respectively. Second, GASi(t-1) is removed. Instead, the loan/
asset ratio, LONi(t), and the deposit/ asset ratio, DEPi(t), are included as the risk indicators.
When the loan/ asset ratio rises a sound bank may increase the capital/ asset ratio to prepare for
a growing risk. Likewise, the fall of the deposit/ asset ratio may encourage banks to increase
their capital ratio, partly because it indicates the reduction of the funds available to them, and
partly because it may signal the fall of their social credit.
Hence a positive correlation is expected between EQTi(t) and LONi(t), and a negative
correlation between EQTi(t) and DEP i(t). To summarize, our model is described as:
EQTi(t)=b0+ b1EQTi(t-1)+b2LONi(t)+b3DEP i(t)+ b4PROi(t)+ b5AMi(t)+ui(t)  for i=1,…,n.  (2)
Our expectation from this model is that b1, b2 and b4 are positive, and that b 3 is negative. For
b5, it will be negative if  the amakudari connection still functions as a means of collusion
between the financial authority and banks.
The observation period is from 1992 to 1999, since this study focuses on the period after the
collapse of the bubble economy, and since the latest data available at the time of writing is of
1999. However, the data set includes the data from 1990 to 1991 as well, for the Arellano-Bond
GMM estimation requires as instruments the data at least two years previous to the observation
period. The summary statistics of the data in the period from 1990 to 1999 are presented in
Appendix.
Results
Table 5 shows the result of the GMM estimation with the models (1) and (2) using the data of
the 1990s in the left and centre columns respectively. Since two explanatory variables, the loan/
asset ratio, LONi(t), and the  amakudari connection, AMi(t), turn out to be statistically
insignificant in  the model (2),  the variable LONi(t) is removed  according to  the backward
variable selection (F-threshold is 2.0). The insignificance of LONi(t) is understandable, given
that the amount of loan on the whole is not an adequate indicator of risk. There are safe loans as
well as risky loans, and the reaction of banks should vary from one loan to another. The model
without LONi(t), which we call model (2)', produces the estimates shown in the left column.11
The Sargan test statistics and the Arellano-Bond m2 test statistics show that all models are
neither over-identified nor serially correlated, so that they are considered as statistically robust.
The estimates with the model (1) are largely consistent with the results of the Horiuchi-
Shimizu model in Table 4, despite the differences in the coverage of the data (Horiuchi and
Shimizu included non-listed banks as well as listed banks) and the period. The coefficients of
EQTi(t-1) and GASi(t-1) are similarly positive and those of PROi(t-1) and AM i(t-1) are similarly
negative, although they and their t-statistics are not identical. This may suggest that the negative
effect of the amakudari practice, argued by Horiuchi and Shimizu for the period between 1979
and 1991, still existed after 1992.
Table 5 The effect of amakudari on the capital/ asset ratio of the Japanese regional banks:














AMi(t) -0.003 (1.064) -0.003 (1.929)*
Sargan test 31.063 27.753 33.265
Arellano-Bond m2 test -1.109 0.435 0.395




Note: t-statistics shown in parenthesis. * p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
The negative effect of the amakudari practice are also confirmed by the model (2)', where
the coefficient of AMi(t) is negative and statistically significant at 10% level. The other
variables are also significant, and the previous capital/ asset ratio, EQTi(t-1), and the current
profit/ asset ratio, PROi(t), make positive contribution, and the deposit/ asset ratio, DEPi(t),
makes negative contribution, as expected beforehand.
On this point, it should be remembered that our data set does not include those banks which
failed during the 1990s. Since all those banks employed one or more amakudari executives until
the 1980s, the negative correlation between EQTi(t) and AM i(t) would be even clearer if they12
were included. Conversely, we may reject such an argument that the estimation of Horiuchi and
Shimizu were biased due to some exceptionally bad banks. We have now obtained similar
results from the data even without the failed banks.
Further models and analyses
To estimate the effect of the amakudari practice, neither the Horiuchi-Shimizu model nor the
Van Rixtel-Hassink model takes consideration of any more than the presence of the
employment of amakudari executives. Nevertheless, the pattern of the amakudari employment
is far from identical. Appointment is made either to the presidential position or other less
significant positions. The number of  amakudari executives also varies from one bank to
another. It may be reasonable to hypothesize that those differences should give different effect
on the performance of banks. In order to verify this hypothesis, the model (2)' is modified in two
ways. First, the dummy variable of the employment of  amakudari executives, AMi(t), is
replaced with two dummy variables, AMPi(t) and AMNPi(t). AMP i(t) and AMNPi(t) denote the
employment of  amakudari executives in the  presidential position and in other positions,
respectively. When a bank employs two or more amakudari executives, AMPi(t) equals one
(and AMNPi(t) equals zero) if one of them takes the presidential position. Second, AMi(t), is
replaced with AMNi(t), the variable which represents the number of amakudari executives. The
results are shown in Table 6 and 7.
From the results in Table 6, it follows that the employment of amakudari executives in the
presidential position causes more negative effect than other cases. According to Table 7,
moreover, the number of  amakudari executives seems to be a significant variable, whose
explanatory power is rather more robust than the dummy variable of amakudari employment. It
is noteworthy that the number of amakudari variable has larger significance than the dummy
variable for amakudari employment in the model (2)'. Given this result, it may be said that the
amakudari practice has reduced its effect on the whole, as the number of amakudari executives
decreased since 1996, as shown in Figure 2.
Table 6 The effect of the amakudari employment in the presidential and non-presitential
positions on the capital/ asset ratio of the Japanese regional banks: the results of13









Arellano-Bond m2 test 0.391
No. of observations 656
Estimates
Note: t-statistics shown in parenthesis. * p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
Table 7 The effect of the number of amakudari executives on the capital/ asset ratio of the
Japanese regional banks: the results of GMM estimation, dependent variable:







Arellano-Bond m2 test -0.369
No. of observations 656
Estimates (t-statistics)
Note: t-statistics shown in parenthesis. * p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
However, this does not mean that the effect of the  amakudari practice in each case has
reduced as well. Of course, it is not surprising that the effect has been diminished because of
such changes as the rise of public concern about  amakudari and the restructuring of the
supervision of banks in the late 1990s. The new agency for the financial supervision, the
Financial Supervisory Agency, was organizationally independent of MoF, hence the influence
of amakudari executives on the supervising operation may well have diminished. To see the
change over time, another model is formulated by distinguishing the effect of amakudari in the
earlier period (1992-5) and in the later period (1996-9). Therefore, the model (2)' is modified as
follows:14
EQTi(t)=b0+ b1EQTi(t-1)+b3DEP i(t)+ b4PROi(t)+AM92-5i(t)+AM96-9i(t)+ui(t)
for i=1,…,n (2)"
AM92-5i(t) and AM96-9i(t) are  time-related dummy variables for the employment of
amakudari executives from 1992 to 1995 and from 1996 to 1999 respectively. The effect of the
number of amakudari executives is also examined by using time-related variables, AMN92-5i(t)
and AMN96-9i(t). The results are shown in Table 8. AM92-5i(t) is marginally insignificant at
the 10% level, but AM96-9i(t) is negative at the 5% level. AMN92-5i(t) and AM96-9i(t) are
negative at the 5% level and the 1% level respectively.
Table 8 The effect of amakudari on the capital/ asset ratio of the Japanese regional banks
(time-related dummy variables): the results of GMM estimation, dependent











Sargan test 31.084 19.287
Arellano-Bond m2 test 0.098 -0.267
No. of observations 656 656
Estimates (t-statistics)
Note: t-statistics shown in parenthesis. * p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
The results imply that the negative effect of amakudari, in terms of both employment and
number, is greater and more significant in the second period than in the first period. In other
words, the difference between amakudari banks and non-amakudari banks became even more
salient in the later period. This may sound strange. Given the changes stated above, it may be
more natural to expect that the negative effect of amakudari should get smaller as time goes on.
One possible interpretation of the results is that the appointment of amakudari became more
selective in the later period, so that  amakudari executives were appointed to only very
unhealthy banks. Another interpretation may be that non-amakudari banks were quicker to react
to the social criticism and the new type of supervision than amakudari banks. The results may
reflect both.15
Finally, let us examine the effect of amakudari from the Bank of Japan (BoJ). Following the
Horiuchi-Shimizu model, the above models only take account of amakudari from MoF. Indeed,
Horiuchi and Shimizu rejected the effect of amakudari from BoJ. According to them,  BoJ
amakudari does not affect the performance of banks because BoJ does not have an authority to
supervise the management of banks directly, even though it plays a role of providing special
loans for banks in trouble.
In their study, however, they did not utilize the GMM estimation to examine this hypothesis,
for unknown reasons. Meanwhile, Van Rixtel and Hassink treated amakudari from MoF and
BoJ equally, without any specific discussion. Therefore, it is meaningful to estimate the effect
of BoJ amakudari in our study. Then AMi(t) in the model (2)' is again replaced with AMBi(t)
and AMNBi(t), which represent the employment and the number of amakudari executives from
BoJ respectively. The result is that neither AMBi(t) nor AMNBi(t) is statistically significant, as
shown in Table 9. Even if they are significant, their coefficients are nearly equal to zero, so that
the influence of BoJ amakudari is not observed at all. Therefore, we may conclude the argument
of Horiuchi and Shimizu is acceptable.
Table 9 The effect of the employment and the number of BoJ amakudari executives on the
capital/ asset ratio of the Japanese regional banks: the results of GMM estimation,











Sargan test 32.834 32.364
Arellano-Bond m2 test 0.714 0.744
No. of observations 656 656
Estimates (t-statistics)
Note: t-statistics shown in parenthesis. * p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01
4. Conclusion
This paper examines if, and how much, the amakudari connection affected the performance of
banks in the post-bubble period. According to the general overview, the capital/ asset ratio,16
which is regarded as an indicator of the prudential behaviour of banks, had grown by the end of
the 1990s. In other words, banks appears to have performed more prudently. With the dynamic
panel data analysis of eighty-two regional banks, we also found that the employment of
amakudari executives still had a negative impact on the bank performance. The impact seems to
be larger when amakudari employees took the presidential position. The number of amakudari
executives also seems to matter.
Since the number of amakudari executives was on the decline after 1996, the overall effect
of the amakudari practice was reduced. It should be stressed, however, that the effect of
individual amakudari employment on bank performance became rather more negative and more
significant in more recent years. This is presumably because the appointment of amakudari
became more selective and concentrated more on unhealthy banks, and because the banks
without amakudari executives were more reactive to the changes in the external environment.
It should be remembered, however, that the scope of our data is rather limited. There are
over thirty regional banks excluded from our data set. Their data were not properly available,
either because they had failed and/ or merged with another bank, or because they were not listed
in the stock exchange throughout the period. It should also be noted that this study covers an
only very short period. It is reasonably expected that the effect of amakudari employment will
be less significant in the future, because of the disengagement of the MoF from the financial
supervision by the Financial Supervision Agency. Nonetheless, it is still too early to make a
judgement on the effect of the new supervisory scheme. It should also be remembered that the
government still largely maintains the personnel system where internal promotion is dominant
for the higher-ranking positions, and where amakudari motivates younger officials to work hard
until they reach the top position. Unless this traditional personnel system changes, the impulse
for amakudari positions will not disappear. It is therefore necessary to keep our attention to that
practice at least in the coming years, even though it no doubt becomes less significant.





EQT 0.040 0.009 0.001 0.070
GAS 0.014 0.064 -0.152 1.506
PRO 0.002 0.005 -0.050 0.009
LON 0.685 0.063 0.449 0.850
DEP 0.876 0.035 0.717 1.036
AMN 0.737 0.814 0 4
AMN92-5 0.465 0.759 0 4
AMN96-9 0.272 0.583 0 4




Cases 0 Cases 1
AM 0.543 0.498 375 445
AMP 0.129 0.336 714 106
AMNP 0.413 0.493 481 339
AM92-5 0.329 0.470 550 270
AM96-9 0.213 0.410 645 175
AMB 0.489 0.500 419 401
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